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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we provide new cross-country evidence on the relationship 
between corporate tax rates and the firm size distribution.  Models in which 
higher tax rates are correlated with lower capital to output ratios (Backus et 
al., 2008), and models in which the larger the capital share, the faster growth 
rates decline with size (Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007), suggest a 
possible causation from tax rates to firm size distribution and growth.  
Together, these models imply that the scale dependence of firm growth, 
which represents the firm size distribution, should be positively related to the 
corporate tax rates.  
While there is no empirical support to the relationship between tax rates — 
firm size distribution, a smoking gun from some previous studies suggests 
that it can be studied and tested in a cross-country context.  The main 
purpose of this paper is to provide two extensions of previous research.
1)
  
The first is to examine conceptually the association between corporate tax 
rates and firm size.  Existing research show that fiscal policy can drive 
firms’ profits and investment; see Alesina et al. (2002) and Cummins et al. 
(1996), and firm size distribution and growth; see Alfaro et al. (2008).  As 
we present in section 2, given a resource constraint in the economy, tax rates 
can also influence the scale dependence of firm growth.  We show that in a 
perfectly competitive economy, tax rates are positively correlated with the 
growth of firm size.  Higher tax rates are associated with a lower the 
number of firms so that in the steady state each remaining firm employs a 
larger number of labor, thereby enlarging their size and increasing the 
average growth of firm size in the economy. 
The second contribution is to examine empirically the relationship 
between tax rates and firm size distribution across countries.  Existing 
country-specific evidence shows that there is a significant variation of 
                                                 
1) For previous studies on the firm size distributions, see for example Lucas (1978), Evans 
(1987), Hall (1987), Sutton (1997), Kumar et al. (1999), Pagano and Schivardi (2003), and 
Lotti and Santarelli (2004). 
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corporate tax rates across time and countries (see Slemrod, 2004a; Devereux 
et al., 2008), and that taxes affect industrial structure and organization forms 
(see Romanov, 2006; Goolsbee, 2004; Gordon and Slemrod, 2000; Mackie-
Mason and Gordon, 1997).  In a recent cross-country study, Angelini (2008) 
focuses on financial constraints and find in an Italian and a Non-OECD 
sample that firms that declare to be constrained are on average smaller than 
those that do not, and their firm size distribution is relatively more skewed to 
the right.
2)
  We expand the existing evidence of firm growth determination, 
taking into account the scale dependence, capital share, and corporate tax 
rates across countries.  The baseline estimation confirms previous studies on 
the effects of scale dependence, capital share, age, and profitability on the 
firm growth.  Our main findings show that the positive association between 
corporate tax rates and firm growth are important in the sub-samples of non-
tax haven countries, OECD countries, non-manufacturing firms, and high-
capital share firms. 
Section 2 provides the conceptual model, highlighting the effect of tax 
rates on scale dependence of firm growth.  Section 3 discusses the data and 
presents the empirical findings.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There are a number of channels through which taxes can affect the firm 
size dynamics. In this section, we illustrate one channel by extending Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) model of firm size dynamics with the 
accumulation of industry-specific human capital.  The innovation of our 
partial-equilibrium model is that taxes reduce resources availability in the 
economy so that higher corporate tax rates are associated with a lower the 
number of perfectly-competitive firms, and enlarge the size of the remaining 
                                                 
2) Using a data set of Portuguese firms, Cabral and Mata (2003) show that financial constraints 
can explain the right-skewed firm size distribution.  See also Rajan and Zingales (2001), 
Cooley and Quadrini (2001), and Carpenter and Petersen (2002). 
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firms in the steady state. 
Consider an economy in which each member of households is identical, 
endowed with one unit of labor, and has a preference over the aggregate 
consumption streams ( ).tC   The number of households ( )tL  exogenously 
grows at the rate of ( ).Lg   We assume a well-behaved preference u  — 
increasing and strictly concave.  Accordingly, the aggregate households 
welfare can be expressed as 
 
0
0
,t tt
t t
C
E L u
L



  
  
   
                    (1) 
 
where   is the households discount factor, and 0E  is the expectation 
operator conditional upon available information at the time beginning.  The 
households face the following final outputs constraint: 
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,
J J
t tj tj
j j
C I Q
 
                      (2) 
 
where tjQ  is the final output produced by firms 1,  ...,  ,j J  and tjI  is the 
investment in physical capital by households.  The final output constraint 
implies that final goods can be used for either consumption or investment. 
There are two factors of production: physical capital ( )jtK  and labor 
( ).jtL   The law of motion for physical capital accumulation takes the log-
linear form: 
 
1
1 ,
j j
t j tj tjK K I
 
                     (3) 
 
j  captures the rate of depreciation and the relative importance of 
investment in capital — 0j   implies that capital is completely 
depreciated, and the investment fully contributes to capital stock in next 
period.  Since each member of households are endowed with a unit of labor, 
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the labor employment by each firm  ( )tjj L is constrained by  
1
.
J
t j t
j
L L

  
In addition to physical capital and labor, households are endowed with 
industry-specific human capital ( ),tjH  which also accumulates according to 
the following log-linear form: 
 
1
1 1 ,
j j
t j t j tj tjH A H E
 
                   (4) 
 
where the productivity shock, 1 ,  jjt jA A A      is i.i.d. distributed, and tjE  
is the industry-specific investment in human capital.  j  captures the 
relative importance of the existing human capital and its investment in 
human capital stock in next period.  We assume that human capital 
investment requires final output, and hence the production constraint of firms 
is .tj tj tjQ E Y   
In each period ,t  a firm has to pay a fixed cost jF  denominated in terms 
of final output up front, and produces a numeraire whose price is normalized 
to unity, and production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form.  
There are several ways to introduce the tax parameter into the model: taxes 
on returns to capital, taxes on profits, and indirect taxes (such as value added 
taxes and property taxes, etc.).
3)
  We focus on the tax rates ( )  that are 
time-invariant and are uniformly levied on local production of final output, in 
order to capture the extent to which higher taxes lead to a lower level of 
output; higher tax rates increase total production cost so that firms have to 
cut their production down to maintain their profitability.  Accordingly, the 
aggregate final output production in an economy can be written as 
 
   
1
1 1
1 ,
j
j
j j j j
tj tj tj tj tj j tjY K H L F
   
  

    
  
         (5) 
 
where tj  is the number of firms; [0,  1]j   is the share of capital in total 
                                                 
3) See also Backus et al. (2008) and Desai et al. (2004). 
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production cost; [0,  1]j   captures the share of capital in total labor 
cost;
4)
 and [0,  1]j   implies that the technology is decreasing returns to 
scale. 
In equilibrium, the optimal number of firms is chosen such that the 
aggregate welfare function (1) is maximized, subject to the final output 
constraint (2) and the aggregate final output production (5).  For 
computational simplicity, we focus on the symmetric solution.  The first-
order condition corresponding to the constrained maximization problem is: 
 
1 1
(1 )(1 ) ( ) .j j j j jj j tj tj tj tjF K H L
    
  
     
 
          (6) 
 
Therefore, the optimal number of firms as a function of production factors 
and tax rates can be expressed as 
 
1
11
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The optimal number of firms is decreasing in tax rates ( / 0).tj      
Higher tax rates essentially reduce the production of final output and lower 
the number of firms in the perfectly competitive market.  Define firm size as 
the average number of labor employed by each firm.  By using (7), we 
obtain the equilibrium firm size ( )ijs  as 
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        (8) 
 
The equilibrium size of a firm is increasing in tax rates ( / ).tjs      
Higher tax rates reduce the optimal number of firms, so that each surviving 
                                                 
4) From (5), human capital augments the efficiency units of labor, and is therefore labor-
augmenting. 
Firm Size and Taxes 151 
firm will on average employ more production factors (physical capital, 
human capital, and labor) available in the economy: higher tax rates enlarge 
the equilibrium firm size. 
The effect of higher tax rates on the growth rate of firm size can also be 
derived from the equilibrium firm size.  Consider a zero growth rate of 
population ( 0),Lg 
5)
 using (4), (8), and the final output constraint, the 
growth of firm size in steady state is 
 
1
1
1
ln ln (1 ) ln(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ln
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t j tj j j j j j j tj
j
j j t j
s s C s
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
 


        
 
  (9) 
 
where jC  is a constant term, which is a function of ,jK  ,jN  ,jF  ,j  
,j  and .j   Our stylized model shows that higher corporate tax rates 
tend to increase the growth of firm size, 1(ln ln ) / ln 0.t j tjs s      
We summarize the key implications of our model as follows: In a perfectly 
competitive economy, higher corporate tax rates are positively correlated 
with the growth of firm size.  In steady state each remaining firms employ a 
larger number of labor, thereby enlarging their size and increasing the 
average growth of firm size in the economy. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis builds on the firm level information in the OSIRIS 
database.  From 1997-2008, OSIRIS compiled the data of 40,863 firms in 
139 countries disaggregated into 9 industries (Data Appendix provides the 
detail description).  In the cross-country context, there are at least two 
alternative sources of firm level data: the WorldBase data studied by Alfaro 
                                                 
5) Ones can easily derive the growth of firm size when population is allowed to grow 
exogenously at a positive rate, without changes in our main results. 
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et al. (2008) and the WBES data studied by Angelini (2008).  The former 
contains more than 20 million establishments, but not financial and operation 
data; the latter contains less than 4,000 firms, but with extra firm level 
information, including whether firms are financially constrained.  In 
comparison to these two alternatives, the size and depth of firm-level 
information guide us that OSIRIS data set is more appropriate to test 
equation (9) across countries and years.
6)
 
 
3.1. Tax Rates ( ) 
 
We focus on the statutory corporate tax rates.  Although we could also 
use the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, but this measure of average tax rates is 
subject to data limitation and a variation of tax collection costs across 
countries.
7)
  Table 1 reports the equally-weighted average statutory tax rates 
from 1997 to 2006, for corporate income, personal income, and value-added 
tax (VAT).  Tax rates are higher in OECD than Non-OECD countries, with 
the largest difference in the personal income taxes (12.2%), followed by 
VAT (4.7%) and corporate income taxes (3.1%).  The rates in tax havens 
are clearly much lower.  The dispersion of tax rates tends to be higher 
among the Non-OECD countries.  We can also see that while the corporate 
income and personal income tax rates have declined during the period, the 
VAT rates have increased, the trend that reflects the global shift of tax 
bases.
8)
  The correlation analysis suggests that the corporate tax rates are 
positively associated with the personal tax rates, whereas they are weakly 
associated with the VAT rates in the Non-OECD countries. 
 
                                                 
6)
 Other potential databases, but with less comprehensive and comparable information across 
countries, include Bureau van dijk (BvD) Amadeus for Europe (constructed from national 
registries), Icarus for US (constructed from Dunn & Bradstreet), and Oriana for China 
(constructed from Huaxia credit) and Japan (constructed from Teikoku database); CMIE 
Firstsource dataset for India (constructed from Registry of Companies). 
7) See Plesko (2003) for the differences across alternative measures of corporate tax rates. 
8) See Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009). 
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Table 1 Tax Rates 
Country 
1997-2006 1997-2001 2002-2006 
Avg. Std. Avg. Std. Avg. Std. 
Corporate Income Tax 
OECD 
Non-OECD  
Tax Havens 
31.0 
27.9 
20.3 
2.7 
3.3 
3.1 
32.6 
29.6 
21.2 
1.9 
1.1 
1.1 
29.3 
26.2 
19.1 
1.7 
2.7 
2.8 
Personal Income Tax 
OECD 
Non-OECD  
Tax Havens 
40.2 
28.0 
20.5 
2.9 
2.6 
1.7 
42.2 
29.2 
21.0 
1.9 
0.7 
0.8 
39.0 
27.3 
20.1 
1.6 
1.9 
1.6 
Value-Added Tax 
OECD 
Non-OECD 
Tax Havens 
16.0 
11.3 
7.6 
0.6 
1.7 
0.6 
15.8 
10.7 
7.1 
0.1 
1.4 
0.4 
16.2 
11.7 
7.8 
0.5 
1.2 
0.4 
Correlations Corporate Personal 
Personal 
All Countries 
OECD 
Non-OECD  
Tax Havens 
0.4431
*
 
0.4850
*
 
0.4167
*
 
0.6352
*
 
 
VAT 
All Countries 
OECD 
Non-OECD  
Tax Havens 
0.2488
*
 
–0.0333 
0.2618
*
 
0.5992
*
 
0.3725
*
 
0.2424 
0.3188
*
 
0.2313 
Notes: The top panel reports the average and standard deviation of statutory tax rates, equally 
weighted across countries.  The list of countries in OECD, Non-OECD, and Tax 
Havens is in the Data Appendix.  The bottom panel provides the correlations between 
tax rates.  * signifies statistical significant at 5 percent level. 
 
3.2. Capital Shares ( j ) 
 
We compute the sectoral capital share based on the US industry data 
compiled by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  Table 2 
summarizes the capital shares, averaged over the periods 1987-1996 and 
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Table 2 Capital Shares 
Sector 
Average Capital Share (%) Growth 1987-2006 (%) 
1987-1996 1997-2006 Est. S.E. p-value 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Finance 
Services 
76.5 
61.3 
32.8 
34.8 
34.7 
47.1 
42.7 
77.1 
31.1 
70.4 
70.4 
32.3 
38.4 
37.0 
47.2 
44.1 
75.8 
30.1 
–0.6205 
0.9645 
0.0271 
0.2244 
0.0869 
0.0211 
0.0492 
–0.1995 
–0.2159 
0.1298 
0.1776 
0.0599 
0.0655 
0.0587 
0.0546 
0.0458 
0.0273 
0.0605 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.6568 
0.0030 
0.1562 
0.7033 
0.2963 
0.0000 
0.0022 
Notes: The sectoral capital share is approximated from the US industry data, using the US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data.  For each sector, the capital share is 
constructed as one minus the share of compensation of employees in the value added.  
The growth rate of capital share is estimated from a regression of each sectoral capital 
share on a time trend for the annual periods of 1987-2006 (20 observations for each 
sector). 
 
1997-2006.  Throughout, the capital share is highest in Finance and lowest 
in Services.  For the 20-year period from 1987-2006, the capital share 
increased in Mining (0.96%) and Manufacturing (0.22%), but decreased in 
Agriculture (–0.62%), Finance (–0.19%), and Services (–0.21%).  While the 
capital shares have not changed substantially across industries, we use the 
1987-1996 shares for our analysis on the firm size distribution during 1997-
2006 to avoid multicollinearity and endogeneity issues. 
 
3.3. Empirical Firm Size Distribution 
 
Figure 1 provides the firm size distribution plots.  While the firm size 
distributions of the 1997-2001 and the 2002-2006 periods are similar, there are 
some noticeable differences on the firm size distributions when we disaggregate 
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Figure 1 Density of Firm Size Distribution 
Note: This figure plots the empirical density function on a natural logarithmic (ln) scale, based 
on the OSIRIS data set. 
 
firms into OECD/Non-OECD, Manufacturing/Non-Manufacturing, and 
Capital Share>40%/Capital Share<40%.  To test these differences, we first 
examine whether the firm size distribution is characterized by the 
proportionate growth process, which gives rise to the lognormal distribution.  
We run a regression of the firm size growth on the average firm size between 
two periods  
 
2002 2006 2002 2006 1997 2001
1997 2001
ˆˆ .
2
s s s
a b
s
  


              (10) 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
ln(employ ees)
1997-2001
2002-2006
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
ln(employ ees)
OECD
Non-OECD
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
ln(employ ees)
Non-Manufacturing
Manufacturing
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15
ln(employ ees)
Capital share<40%
Capital share>40%
Aekapol Chongvilaivan · Yothin Jinjarak 156 
Table 3 Empirical Firm Size Distribution in OSIRIS Data Set 
 
Number  
of 
Firms 
Average 
Size 
(Employe
-es) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Gibrat’s 
Coefficient 
Zipf’s 
Coefficient 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Estimate 
(Std. dev.) 
Estimate 
(Std. dev.) 
1998-2007 25,681 3,642 24.4 0.000 1255.3 0.000 –0.36(0.15) –0.42(0.00) 
OECD 17,091 3,844 24.5 0.000 1229.8 0.000 –0.48(0.17) –0.40(0.00) 
Non-OECD 8,212 3,327 17.2 0.000 386.5 0.000 0.05(0.34) –0.51(0.01) 
Manufacturing 11,956 3,633 13.4 0.000 249.9 0.000 –0.57(0.38) –0.45(0.00) 
Non-
Manufacturing 
13,725 3,649 26.8 0.000 1342.6 0.000 –0.26(0.10) –0.40(0.00) 
Capital Share 
<40% 
18,825 3,450 13.4 0.000 244.8 0.000 –0.51(0.24) –0.44(0.00) 
Capital Share  
>40% 
6,856 4,168 27.6 0.000 1253.1 0.000 –0.20(0.11) –0.38(0.00) 
 
Table 3 reports the estimate, also known as the Gibrat coefficient, of –0.36 
and statistically significant at 1 percent level.  The growth rate of firm size 
therefore depends negatively on the size of the firm: smaller firms on average 
do grow faster than larger firms.  At a more disaggregated level, we can also 
see in the fifth column of table 3 that the Gibrat coefficient is statistically 
significant for the firm size distributions in OECD, Non-Manufacturing, and 
sector with capital share < 40%.  
The upper tail of the firm size distribution has often been described by 
Pareto distributions: 0Pr[ ] ( ) ,j
j
s
s s
s
   0 ,  js s  0   where 0s  is the 
minimum size.  We estimate the coefficients of the tail distribution, also 
known as the Zipf’s coefficient:9)  
 
0ln[ ( )] ln .j jP s s s                     (11) 
 
                                                 
9) Other applications of Zipf’s law include cities (Eeckhout, 2004) and financial markets 
(Gabaix et al., 2006). 
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As shown in the last column table 3, for firms in the whole sample and at 
disaggregated level, the tails are thinner than the Pareto.  This finding is 
difference from Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) and Axtell (2001) in the 
sample of U.S. firms where the Zipf’s coefficient is close to one.  The 
difference between the US and the international sample is underlined by the 
fact that the former includes all establishments, whereas the latter is 
comprised of enterprises. 
 
3.4. Econometric Specification 
 
We examine the empirical relationship between the growth rates of firm 
size, 
1
,
t j
tj
s
s

 tax rates ,j  and average capital share ,j  for the period 1997- 
2006 by estimating equation (9):  
 
1
1ln ln(1 ) ln ln ln ,
t j
j j tj j tj t j
tj
s
a b c s d s e A
s
 


 
       
 
   (12) 
 
where ,j ja C  
1
(1 ),j
j
b 

    (1 )(1 ),j jc       (1 ) ,j jd       
(1 ).j je      
The conceptual framework predicts that b  and d  should be negative 
and significant, and e  be positive.  Like in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 
(2007), the larger the capital share, the faster growth rates decline with size, 
so that 0.d   As in Angelini (2008), we expect 0.e    To take into 
account other firm and sector specific factors, we include for ja  firm’s age 
and sectoral capital share from 1987-1996.  To summarize, 
 
1
1ln (1 ) ln ln ln .
                ( ,  )      ( )         ( )        ( )         ( )
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j j tj tj t j
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3.5. Results 
 
Table 4 reports the baseline estimation.  While our focus is on the 
corporate tax rates, throughout we also provide the estimates using the 
personal income and the value added tax rates.  To allow for tax policy in 
tax havens and the rest, the top half of table 4 reports the estimates from the 
sample excluding firms in tax havens, whereas the bottom half includes all 
firms.  As predicted by our conceptual framework, the corporate tax rates 
are positively associated with firm size: raising the corporate tax rates by 5% 
increases the average growth of firm size by 3%.  The estimation also shows 
that scale dependence increases with the sectoral capital shares.  The 
coefficient estimate on the capital share is positive and statistically 
significant.  In line with the previous studies, lagged firm size, age, and 
return on assets have the expected effects on the firm size. 
Table 5 contrasts firms in OECD and Non-OECD countries.  The 
coefficient estimates on lagged firm size, age, and return on assets have the 
expected signs.  Corporate tax rates have a negative relationship with firm 
size in the sample of OECD countries.  This means that the large dispersion 
of tax rates among the Non-OECD as reported in table 1 has yet to 
significantly influence the firm size distribution.  Further, we can also see 
that splitting the sample into OECD and Non-OECD reduces the significance 
of capital share in explaining the growth of firm size across countries.  
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the capital share at country level to 
examine whether the capital shares do not vary across sectors within and 
between the OECD and Non-OECD groups. 
Table 6 provides the estimates for manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors.  Again, the lagged firm size, age, and return on assets remain 
statistically significant with expected sign.  However, the corporate tax rates 
are positive and statistically significant only for the non-manufacturing sector.  
In addition, the value added tax rates are negative and strongly significant to 
the Manufacturing sector.  The difference between the size distribution for 
firms in intermediate input and final good manufacturing industries may shed 
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Table 4 Firm Size Growth and Tax Rates: Baseline Estimation 
Dependent Variable:  
Growth of Number of  
Employees from t to t+1 
Tax Rates 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Value-Added Tax 
Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) 
 Excluding Firms in Tax Haven Countries 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital  
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst) 
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.60 (0.17)*** 
0.35 (0.17)
**
 
–0.03 (0.01)** 
–0.05 (0.03)** 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
4,622 
–0.21 (0.06)*** 
0.38 (0.17)
**
 
–0.03 (0.01)** 
–0.05 (0.03)* 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
4,622 
0.07 (0.11) 
0.42 (0.17)
**
 
–0.02 (0.01)* 
–0.06 (0.03)** 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
4,622 
 All Firms 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital 
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst) 
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.16 (0.11) 
0.21 (0.17) 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
–0.03 (0.03) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
5,035 
–0.12 (0.05)** 
0.21 (0.17) 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
–0.03 (0.03) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
5,035 
0.09 (0.10) 
0.23 (0.17) 
–0.03 (0.01)*** 
–0.04 (0.03) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.07 
5,035 
Notes: This table provides the estimates obtained from the regression equation (12).  t 
denotes years 1997-2001 and t+1 denotes 2002-2006.  The growth rates of firm size 
are between t and t+1.  Tax Rates are the average statutory rates.  Average Capital 
Share is the average between t and t+1.  Return on assets is the profits before taxes. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**, *) represents statistically significant at 1 (5, 
10) percent level. 
 
light on the forces that determine the effects of the value added tax rates; a 
frequently cited advantage of the value added taxes is that this tax is collected 
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Table 5 Estimation Results: OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
Dependent Variable:  
Growth of Number of  
Employees from t to t+1 
Tax Rates 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Value-Added Tax 
Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) 
 
Firms in OECD 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital  
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst) 
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.51 (0.19)*** 
0.09 (0.18) 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
–0.01 (0.03) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.08 
3,669 
–0.12 (0.07)* 
0.10 (0.18) 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
–0.01 (0.03)* 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.08 
3,669 
0.03 (0.11) 
0.13 (0.18) 
–0.03 (0.01)** 
–0.01 (0.03) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.08 
3,669 
 Firms in Non-OECD 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital  
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst) 
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
0.05 (0.15) 
0.09 (0.38) 
–0.08 (0.03)*** 
–0.01 (0.06) 
 
–0.09 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
***
 
0.08 
1,366 
–0.12 (0.11) 
0.09 (0.38) 
–0.09 (0.03)*** 
–0.01 (0.06) 
 
–0.09 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
***
 
0.09 
1,366 
0.31 (0.26) 
0.13 (0.38) 
–0.08 (0.03)** 
–0.02 (0.06) 
 
–0.10 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
***
 
0.09 
1,366 
Notes: This table provides the estimates obtained from the regression equation (12).  t 
denotes years 1997-2001 and t+1 denotes 2002-2006.  The growth rates of firm size 
are between t and t+1.  Tax Rates are the average statutory rates.  Average Capital 
Share is the average between t and t+1.  Return on assets is the profits before taxes. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**, *) represents statistically significant at 1 (5, 
10) percent level. 
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Table 6 Estimation Results: Manufacturing and 
Non-Manufacturing Industries 
Dependent Variable:  
Growth of Number of  
Employees from t to t+1 
Tax Rates 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Value-Added Tax 
Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) 
 Manufacturing Firms 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital  
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst) 
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
0.15 (0.14) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
 
 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.09 
2,674 
–0.06 (0.07) 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
 
 
–0.05 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.09 
2,674 
0.34 (0.14)
**
 
 
–0.06 (0.01)*** 
 
 
–0.04 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.10 
2,674 
 Non-Manufacturing Firms 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital 
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst)  
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.41 (0.16)** 
0.41 (0.21)
**
 
–0.00 (0.02) 
–0.07 (0.03)** 
 
–0.07 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.06 
2,361 
–0.16 (0.08)** 
0.42 (0.21)
**
 
–0.01 (0.02) 
–0.07 (0.03)** 
 
–0.07 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.06 
2,361 
–0.09 (0.15) 
0.39 (0.21)
*
 
–0.01 (0.02) 
–0.07 (0.03)** 
 
–0.07 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.06 
2,361 
Notes: This table provides the estimates obtained from the regression equation (12).  t 
denotes years 1997-2001 and t+1 denotes 2002-2006.  The growth rates of firm size 
are between t and t+1.  Tax Rates are the average statutory rates.  Average Capital 
Share is the average between t and t+1.  Return on assets is the profits before taxes. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**, *) represents statistically significant at 1 (5, 
10) percent level. 
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Table 7 Estimation Results: Low and High Capital Share Sectors 
Dependent Variable:  
Growth of Number of  
Employees from t to t+1 
Tax Rates 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Value-Added Tax 
Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) Coeff. (Std.) 
 
Capital Sharet < 40% 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital 
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst)  
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.02 (0.12) 
7.52 (1.94)
***
 
0.24 (0.06)
***
 
–0.84 (0.18)*** 
 
–0.05 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.09 
3,934 
–0.06 (0.06) 
7.61 (1.94)
***
 
0.24 (0.06)
***
 
–0.84 (0.18)*** 
 
–0.05 (0.01)*** 
0.06 (0.01)
***
 
0.09 
3,934 
0.11 (0.11) 
7.49 (1.93)
***
 
0.24 (0.06)
***
 
–0.84 (0.18)*** 
 
–0.05 (0.01)*** 
0.07 (0.01)
***
 
0.09 
3,934 
 
Capital Sharet > 40% 
ln(1–Tax Ratest) 
Capital Sharet 
ln(Employeest) 
Average Capital 
Share*ln(Employeest) 
ln(Age) 
ln(Return on Assetst)  
R-sq. 
Number of Firms 
–0.42 (0.22)* 
0.76 (0.45)
*
 
0.04 (0.05) 
–0.13 (0.07)* 
 
–0.08 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
**
 
0.06 
1,101 
–0.26 (0.12)** 
0.75 (0.45)
*
 
0.03 (0.05) 
–0.12 (0.07)* 
 
–0.08 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
**
 
0.06 
1,101 
0.12 (0.24) 
0.80 (0.46)
*
 
0.04 (0.05) 
–0.13 (0.07)* 
 
–0.07 (0.02)*** 
0.05 (0.02)
**
 
0.05 
1,101 
Notes: This table provides the estimates obtained from the regression equation (12).  t 
denotes years 1997-2001.  t and t+1 denotes 2002-2006.  The growth rates of firm 
size are between t and t+1.  Tax Rates are the average statutory rates.  Average 
Capital Share is the average between t and t+1.  Return on assets is the profits before 
taxes. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** (**, *) represents statistically significant 
at 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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throughout the production chain.  Our conceptual framework focuses, 
however, on a production of final goods, and therefore it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to evaluate effects of the value added taxes. 
Table 7 presents separately the estimates for the low and the high capital 
share sectors.  This dichotomy provides similar results to the estimation on 
the whole sample reported in table 4.  However, we can see that the 
corporate tax rates have positive but significant only to the growth of firm 
size in the high capital share sectors.  For the low capital share sectors, the 
estimation and large coefficient estimates on the capital share itself are 
driven by the high growth rates of the manufacturing sectors.  Although our 
conceptual framework does not capture the interaction between tax rates and 
capital shares, the results in table 7 suggest that this issue deserves further 
investigation. 
 
3.6. Discussion 
 
The questions remain: (i) what is the difference between the effects on 
firm growth of corporate, personal income, and value added tax rates; (ii) 
what is the relation between the effects of corporate tax rates and sectoral 
capital shares.  On (i), figure 2 plots the empirical firm size distribution for 
various levels and types of tax rates, and summarized in table 8.  While the 
level of tax brackets are chosen arbitrary, we can see that the skewness and 
the peakedness of the firm size distribution increase with the corporate tax 
rates, but not with the personal income and value added tax rates, or firm’s age.  
These empirical characteristics help explain the positive and large effects of 
the corporate tax rates, comparing to the personal income and value added 
tax rates in table 4.  Hence, while our conceptual framework does not 
accommodate the personal and value added tax rates, future investigation 
should allow this non-linearity. 
To delve further into the interaction between the corporate tax rates and 
the sectoral capital shares, we estimate the Zipf’s regression 
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Figure 2 Tax Rates and Density of Firm Size Distribution 
Note: This figure plots the empirical density function on a natural logarithmic (ln) scale across 
tax rates (%) and firm age (years), based on the OSIRIS data set. 
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ˆ ˆln[ ( )] ln( ),P employees x employees     
 
for firms disaggregated into four categories based on the corporate tax rates 
and sectoral capital shares.  The results are in table 9, which shows that the 
estimate of 1ˆ  is negative and statistically significant.  The coefficient 
estimate for 0.4,  0.3c   is higher (in absolute term) than for  
0.4,  0.3.c     For 0.4,   lower corporate tax rates result in a lower 
estimate (in absolute term) than the Zipf’s coefficient (which is one).  As 
illustrated in figures 3 and 4, the tails of firm size distribution are thinner 
than the Pareto, but the difference is larger for the high capital share and low 
tax rate, 0.4,  0.3.c    
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Table 8 Tax Rates and Firm Size Density in the OSIRIS Data Set 
 ln(employees) Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Corporate Income Tax 
< 10 
[11, 30] 
> 30 
6.352 
6.342 
5.759 
1.913 
1.825 
2.282 
–0.004 
–0.013 
0.044 
2.688 
3.444 
2.841 
Personal Income Tax 
< 30 
[31, 40] 
> 40 
6.203 
5.878 
6.109 
1.945 
2.124 
2.327 
–0.021 
0.093 
–0.382 
3.243 
3.022 
2.971 
Value-Added Tax 
< 10 
[11, 20] 
> 20 
5.835 
6.342 
5.851 
2.125 
2.103 
2.292 
–0.009 
–0.151 
0.038 
3.049 
3.085 
2.973 
Age 
< 15 
[16, 45] 
> 45 
5.644 
6.197 
6.084 
2.100 
1.770 
2.303 
–0.001 
–0.194 
–0.025 
2.951 
3.877 
2.790 
 
Table 9 Firm Size Distribution, Capital Shares 
and Corporate Tax Rates 
0 1
ˆ ˆln[ ( )] ln( )P employees x employees     
Capital Share ( )  
Corporate Tax ( )
c  
Est. S.E. p-value R
2
 Size Bins 
0.40, 0.30c     
0.40, 0.30c     
0.40, 0.30c     
0.40, 0.30c     
–0.5090 
–0.3944 
–0.3535 
–0.4133 
0.5616 
0.0411 
0.0370 
0.0491 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.8808 
0.8732 
0.8701 
0.8522 
40 
40 
40 
40 
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Figure 3 Distribution of Firm Sizes by Capital Share and 
Corporate Tax Rates, 2002-2006 
Notes: The figure presents the probability that firms are larger than a particular size against 
that size in 1997-2001.  It also presents the same probability for a Pareto density with 
coefficient one. The data on the number of firms are aggregated into 40 bins, based on 
the OSIRIS data set. 
 
Figure 4 Distribution of Firm Sizes in High Capital Share Sectors, 
2002-2006 
Notes: The figure presents the probability that firms in high capital share sectors (capital 
share>40%) are larger than a particular size against that size in 1997-2001.  It also 
presents the same probability for a Pareto density with coefficient one.  The data on 
the number of firms are aggregated into 40 bins, based on the OSIRIS data set. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the hypothesis that the scale dependence of firm 
growth, which represents the firm size distribution, is positively related to the 
corporate tax rates.  The main contributions of our paper have been to 
present a model linking the corporate tax rates and firm size, and to report 
their empirical association in a cross-country sample.  The baseline 
estimation confirm previous studies on the effects of scale dependence, 
capital share, age, and profitability on the firm growth.  Our key results 
show that the positive association between corporate rates and firm growth 
are important in the sub-samples of non-tax haven countries, OECD 
countries, non-manufacturing firms, and high-capital share firms. 
Although our findings show that on average the corporate tax rates are 
positively associated with the growth of firm size, we do not portray to 
determine what would be the optimal rates for the firm growth and size 
distribution.  Given the importance of firm size distribution to economic 
growth, we observe in the data that in so far that the role of corporate 
taxation is clearly evident in the OECD countries and non-manufacturing 
sectors.  The insignificance of corporate tax rates on the firm size 
distributions in the developing countries does not imply that taxation there is 
irrelevant.  Instead, it is more likely that the effects of taxation on firm size 
distributions among the developing countries would be sensitive to 
alternative sources of data, alternative measures of firm size, alternative 
measures of effective tax rates, and the existence of shadow economies; see 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), Johnson et al. (2007), Gordon and Li (2007), 
Slemrod (2004b), and Schneider and Enste (2000).  Studying the 
relationship between taxation and firm size could also be further complicated 
by the changing composition of tax bases across the countries, though we 
present in this paper some evidence that the effects of personal income and 
value added tax rates are insignificant in our sample. 
There are still a number of issues not answered in our paper.  Our 
conceptual model and empirical framework assume the causation from 
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corporate tax rates to firm size distribution.  Since the reverse causation 
cannot be ruled out, one useful extension is to examine firm size as a proxy 
for the firm’s political costs as in Zimmerman (1983).  It is also interesting 
to explore in the cross-country data the relationship between local industry 
turnover, the disappearance of old-fashioned and declining sectors such as 
agriculture or mining, and taxation, as some recent studies have shown that 
the industry churning is an important determinant to the growth process; see 
Duranton (2007) and Findeisen and Südekum (2008).  Future works can 
also be extended to study the firm size distribution and wages (Oi and Idson, 
1999), which in a cross-country context is related to firm boundary, 
multinational corporations, and international trade along the lines of Bernard 
and Jansen (2007) and Antràs and Helpman (2004). 
 
 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
The data is collected on annual basis from 1992-2006. 
 
Tax Rates: PriceWaterhouse Center for Transnational Taxation’ Corporate 
Taxes and Individual Taxes, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu’s International Tax 
and Business Guides, Coopers & Lybrand’ 1998 International Tax 
Summaries, and KPMG International’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey (various 
issues). 
 
Capital Share: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
 
Firm-level Characteristics: OSIRIS (Bureau van Dijk) 
Size: Number of Employees 
Age: Date of Incorporation 
Return on Assets: Net Income/Total Assets 
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Sectoral Classification: 
Division 1:  
Agriculture,  
Forestry, and  
Fishing 
SIC 01: Agricultural Production Crops; SIC 02: 
Agriculture production livestock and animal specialties; 
SIC 07: Agricultural Services; SIC 08: Forestry; SIC 09: 
Fishing, hunting, and trapping 
Division 2: 
Mining 
SIC 10: Metal Mining; SIC 12: Coal Mining; SIC 13: Oil 
And Gas Extraction; SIC 14: Mining and Quarrying Of 
Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 
Division 3:  
Construction  
SIC 15: Building Construction General Contractors And 
Operative Builders; SIC 16: Heavy Construction Other 
Than Building Construction Contractors; SIC 17: 
Construction Special Trade Contractors 
Division 4:  
Manufacturing 
 
SIC 20: Food And Kindred Products; SIC 21: Tobacco 
Products; SIC 22: Textile Mill Products; SIC 23: Apparel 
And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And 
Similar Materials; SIC 24: Lumber And Wood Products, 
Except Furniture; SIC 25: Furniture And Fixtures; SIC 
26: Paper And Allied Products; SIC 27: Printing, 
Publishing, And Allied Industries; SIC 28: Chemicals 
And Allied Products; SIC 29: Petroleum Refining And 
Related Industries; SIC 30: Rubber And Miscellaneous 
Plastics Products; SIC 31: Leather And Leather Products; 
SIC 32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products; SIC 
33: Primary Metal Industries; SIC 34: Fabricated Metal 
Products, Except Machinery And Transportation 
Equipment; SIC 35: Industrial And Commercial 
Machinery And Computer Equipment; SIC 36: Electronic 
And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment; SIC 37: Transportation 
Equipment; SIC 38: Measuring, Analyzing, And 
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And 
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks; SIC 39: 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
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Division 5:  
Transportation, 
Communications,  
Electric, Gas,  
and Sanitary  
Services 
SIC 40: Railroad Transportation; SIC 41: Local And 
Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger 
Transportation; SIC 42: Motor Freight Transportation 
And Warehousing; SIC 43: United States Postal Service; 
SIC 44: Water Transportation; SIC 45: Transportation By 
Air; SIC 46: Pipelines, Except Natural Gas; SIC 47: 
Transportation Services; SIC 48: Communications; SIC 
49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
Division 6:  
Wholesale Trade 
SIC 50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods; SIC 51: 
Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 
Division 7:  
Retail Trade 
SIC 52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 
and Mobile Home Dealers; SIC 53: General Merchandise 
Stores; SIC 54: Food Stores; SIC 55: Automotive Dealers 
And Gasoline Service Stations; SIC 56: Apparel And 
Accessory Stores; SIC 57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, 
And Equipment Stores; SIC 58: Eating And Drinking 
Places; SIC 59: Miscellaneous Retail 
Division 8:  
Finance,  
Insurance, and  
Real Estate 
SIC 60: Depository Institutions; SIC 61: Non-depository 
Credit Institutions; SIC 62: Security And Commodity 
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services; SIC 63: 
Insurance Carriers; SIC 64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, 
And Service; SIC 65: Real Estate; SIC 67: Holding And 
Other Investment Offices 
Division 9:  
Services 
SIC 70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other 
Lodging Places; SIC 72: Personal Services; SIC 73: 
Business Services; SIC 75: Automotive Repair, Services, 
And Parking; SIC 76: Miscellaneous Repair Services; 
SIC 78: Motion Pictures; SIC 79: Amusement And 
Recreation Services; SIC 80: Health Services; SIC 81: 
Legal Services; SIC 82: Educational Services; SIC 83: 
Social Services; SIC 84: Museums, Art Galleries, And 
Botanical And Zoological Gardens; SIC 86: Membership 
Organizations; SIC 87: Engineering, Accounting, 
Research, Management, And Related Services; SIC 88: 
Private Households; SIC 89: Miscellaneous Services 
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Country Groups: 
OECD Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Republic of Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Non-OECD Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, China, People’s Republic of Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast (Cote d’Lvoire), 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of 
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, St. Lucia, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay, Uzekistan, Republic of Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Tax Havens Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Republic of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore, St. 
Lucia, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay 
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